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ABSTRACT:
Canary Wharf is a current example of the implementation of
foreign real estate development opportunities. In 1985, a
consortium of American investment banks proposed the
development of a financial office center outside the
established city core, three miles east of the City of
London. Canary Wharf was to include 12 million square feet
of office and other commercial space developed over eight to
ten years at a cost of E3 billion ($4.8 million). The
project is located in the derelict Docklands area of London,
where public economic incentives for redevelopment are being
offered. The project aggressively seeks to fulfill recent
surges in office demand from financial tenants, brought about
by the deregulation of the London stock market and the
emergence of London as a major international finance center.
An analysis of Canary Wharf and other previous and present
American development attempts in foreign markets concludes
that foreign development projects are more complex and more
risky than local development attempts. Many non-development
risks arise, relating to a foreign developer's lack of
sufficient local knowledge. Other issues include political
risk, exchange rate risks, taxes and other regulatory
implications. The American developer seeking entry into
foreign development markets must compare their skills and
expertise to local competition and determine methods of
compensating for deficiencies.
Some American developers have special skills and expertise
which may give them a competitive advantage in foreign real
estate markets. This expertise stems from experience with
progressive projects in competitive and complex U.S. markets.
But rigorous research into the additional risks inherent in
foreign projects must be undertaken before it can be concluded
that they will possess a clear advantage over local firms.
Thesis Supervisor: James McKellar
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CHAPTER 1:
Introduction
In recent years the capital markets serving the real estate
industry have become much more internationalized. Investment
bankers and real estate professionals have discovered the
benefits of tapping international capital markets for real
estate development deals, acquisitions, and syndications. As
a result, substantial savings in costs of capital have been
realized through access to international capital markets.
Similarly, many professional firms which consult to real
estate developers, such as architects, planners, engineers,
and others, have found that there is a strong foreign market
for their services. They have been actively pursuing and
receiving commissions in foreign countries for many years.
Most American development companies have been and continue to
be hesitant, however, to export their development expertise.
This thesis seeks to explore why there have been so few
successful international development projects led by American
development companies. In the process it will also analyze
the pertinent issues surrounding the implementation of
American development expertise in foreign markets.
In the coming years, foreign development projects may prove
to be more attractive to many North American development
companies for a number of reasons. First, given the cyclical
nature of most local real estate markets, overseas
development skills and ventures may provide large development
companies with an opportunity to geographically diversify,
thereby reducing their risk exposure. Second, many economic
forecastors feel that a considerable number of foreign real
estate markets will grow at a more rapid pace than those in
the U.S. and Canada. Third, U.S. developers may find that
they have exceptional skills which may set them apart from,
and ahead of, the local competition. Finally, as markets
around the world become more internationalized, a development
company's presence in many foreign markets may allow them the
opportunity to provide special global services leading to a
larger and more loyal international tenant base.
Many of the larger, internationally-known American
development companies have attempted to develop projects
abroad during the past ten to fifteen years. Some of these
companies have been successful while many have experienced
substantial difficulty and have not returned to foreign
markets since their initial venture. Still, the exportation
of American development expertise overseas appears to many
real estate professionals to represent a tremendous future
market for the American developer. In addition, we, and many
other observers of the American development scene, believe
that there are a number of distinctive traits which are
relatively unique to the most successful real estate
developers in the North American marketplace on which they
should be able to capitalize in the global marketplace.
It was essentially this line of reasoning that led a small
group of American investment bankers to establish the Canary
Wharf Development Company in London in 1985. This group
sought to construct a large, commercial office project which
would total approximately 12 million square feet of space
when built out over an eight to ten year period.
The master plan and organization of the Canary Wharf project
sought to fully exploit the best traditions of the American
real estate development process and to do so in a foreign
environment where few competitors would be expected. The
project was large by any standard, but in London it was
considered gargantuan. One English professional summed up
local opinion: "Only Americans would have the cheekiness to
propose something like it."
Besides the sheer volume of the project, the developers
proposed a design scheme which was also revolutionary for
London and quite consciously so. In classic American
fashion, the consortium proposed that the project include the
three tallest buildings in Europe in order to both lure
prospective corporate headquarters and, "to establish the
visual presence of the project on the London skyline." 2 They
also planned to build a number of grand, new, urban spaces in
the best tradition of Victorian London, including one which
would be "twice as big as Trafalgar Square," 3 and, would
house the most state-of-the-art commercial office space in
all of Europe. Building construction was to be accomplished
in record-setting time due to the implementation of American
fast-track construction management techniques.
The project resembled the most progressive American
development schemes as it sought to fully exploit the local
government's urban redevelopmnet incentives and relaxed
planning policies. The Canary Wharf Development Company (CWDC)
entered into what was essentially an English version of an
American public-private partnership with the local London
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). The CWDC benefited
from the public agency's marketing efforts for the
redevelopment of the Docklands area and an extremely
streamlined planning approval process. Furthermore, they
planned to take full advantage in their early marketing
efforts of the effect the LDDC's property tax abatements and
major infrastructure improvements would have on the project's
bottom line. The initial office space was projected to cost
approximately 40 percent less than the comparable center city
rents due to the project's uniquely low land and taxation
costs.
The marketing scheme for the project was agressive. Many
conservative, native Londoners felt it bordered on brash -
typical of an American response to the development of an
innovative real estate project in a pioneering location. The
Canary Wharf consortium felt that the project needed to:
start with a bang; be perceived as progressing rapidly; and,
maintain a high public profile in order to assure prospective
tenants and public officials of the sincerity of the
proposal. In addition, the consortium was very aware that
the recent deregulation of the London stockmarket had granted
them a narrow window of opportunity in which to secure prime
tenants.
The Canary Wharf project was seen by locals as a good example
of the implementation of American development expertise and
the publicity of the project in the U.S. created envy among
U.S. counterparts. The consortium was initially successful
in its ability to proceed through immense political and
economic barriers. Many locals labeled this a classic
American "can do" approach. Unfortunately the project failed
to live up to the expectations of the founding members of the
development consortium. So great were the surprises that in
July 1987, the entire project was sold to the Canadian-based,
international development company, Olympia & York of Toronto,
Canada.
This thesis will explore the special aspects and risks that
were involved in this venture as well as other American
ventures which were undertaken in foreign markets. It will
analyze whether the Canary Wharf project is a good model for
other developers seeking to export their development
expertise. If not, what are the limitations which may be
imposed on that expertise when going abroad?
organization
An overview of the evolution of the London real estate market
during the 1980's is initially provided. A detailed history
of the Canary Wharf project is then presented as a case
study. A retrospective history of previous American ventures
abroad follows the case study, in order that analysis and
conclusions may be drawn on a more general level. The
analysis section then focuses on the evidence from the Canary
Wharf project and other overseas development projects to
examine the opportunities that were available to American
development companies and their relative success or failure.
Major non-market risks of foreign ventures are also analyzed
including: exchange rates; taxation; regulation; and,
cultural differences. Conclusions and recommendations
follow. Possible areas of foreign opportunity are briefly
outlined in the Appendix.
Methodology
On-site research was conducted during a two week visit to
London and Paris during the months of June and July 1987.
Many individuals, in both the public and private sectors,
were interviewed. These included the management of the
Canary Wharf Development Company and other individuals
knowledgable with the London commercial property market.
This research included site visits and a review of general
commercial real estate practices and market conditions in
London. Research was also conducted surrounding the events
leading up to the October 1986 deregulation of the London
securities markets, commonly referred to as the "Big Bang,"
and the specific effects of that deregulation on the local
real estate market.
Questions posed to interviewees varied based on the specific
expertise of the individual. Most interviewees were asked
whether they felt Americans have specific areas of expertise
or special skills that add value to development projects.
Competitive advantages and disadvantages of American
developers were also discussed including any possible
barriers to entry. The ability of American developers to
work within the standard development procedures of the London
(or other foreign) market was discussed.
Research conducted in the United States included telephone
interviews with American development and financial
organizations who had been or were considering becoming
involved with development projects in foreign countries.
Development objectives and strategies were discussed in
addition to personal and organizational experiences in
foreign markets.
Scope
It is impossible to catalogue all of the prospective American
developers who may have researched entry into the European
market. It was difficult even to ascertain how many American
development ventures were actually completed. Relatively few
projects seem to have been completed at the time of this
writing. Therefore, the evidence upon which this analysis is
based is not extensive. However, some consistent trends and
patterns had emerged from those offshore ventures which have
taken place.
In order to attain a wider scope within this study, and to
determine how a radically different culture may affect the
success of foreign developers, on-site research was also
conducted in Paris, France. In Paris, standard operating
procedures for commercial development and the general Paris
commercial market were reviewed, previous American attempts
in this market were analyzed, and interviews were conducted
with developers, chartered surveyors, and financial
institutions.
We think that, although the examples cited throughout are
primarily of development companies from the United States and
Canada seeking to enter markets outside of North America, the
lessons learned have general implications and could be
applied to other international real estate development
ventures.
CHAPTER 2:
Overview of the London Situation
The dynamics of the London office market changed greatly
during the mid-1980's. Traditional methods of finance,
design and construction were altered, sometimes radically, in
response to changing market conditions. As demand for new
office space grew rapidly, fueled primarily by demand from
the the City's financial sector, rents skyrocketed and
planning procedures were reluctantly loosened. In the
process, the London market began to more closely resemble the
office markets of many North American cities. This chapter
provides a synopsis of the situation in London that the
Canary Wharf Development Company encountered during its
effort to develop the largest commercial project in Europe.
Rental Rates
The London office market, until approximately five years ago,
had been quite conservative and placid. The Class-A market
traditionally centered around the Bank of England within the
historic City of London commonly known as "the square mile."
There, large institutional banking, insurance and
professional services firms traditionally sought to be
located as close to the Bank as possible. Rent rates
reflected these market forces.
Rents in London, relative to that of other world financial
centers, have always been high. This has historically been
attributed to the constriction on developable land proximate
to the Bank and to the relatively limited supply of new space
in relation to demand which traditionally resulted in very
low vacancy rates.
Financing
Financing of London development traditionally was provided by
large English institutions. Because cash-on-cash yields on
class-A commercial office properties in the City were usually
in the five to seven percent range, long-term debt financing
had not been encouraged nor typically available to
developers. Instead, most new projects were financed by
short-term construction debt financing followed by a cash
purchase of the completed project by an institutional
investor, often an insurance company or a pension fund. Only
a small percentage of properties were held by developers
after completion and initial rent-up because of the large
equity commitment required.
Financing constraints also effected the development of London
in other ways. In addition to the financial arguments
against debt financing because of the negative leverage or
the "reverse yield gap" as it is called in England, most of
the large institutional investors have been philosophically
opposed to funding real estate debt. The real estate crash
of 1973-74 caused a number of highly leveraged young
developers to default on City properties and left their
institutional lenders with a portfolio of overvalued assets.
Commercial mortgages from institutional lenders had been
practically non-existant since that point.
Institutional equity commitments for long term financing of
specific projects usually came in the form of a "forward
purchase commitment." Developers, unless they were highly
capitalized themselves, had trouble securing construction
loans without this takeout commitment. This financial
leverage enabled institutions to exert a considerable amount
of control over the entire development process. Many experts
on the London real estate market felt that institutional
conservatism was largely to blame for the lack of mixed-use
projects, the relatively mundane architecture of most large
office buildings and the limited scale of new development
projects.
A number of related factors led to an effective cap on the
size of new real estate developments in London of E50 to E100
million (approximately $80 to $160 million). First, British
law prohibited a fiduciary from commiting more than five
percent of a fund's assets to any one property investment.
This restricted the pool of large, potential take-out sources
to about six insurance companies and a similar number of
pension funds.4 Second, institutional investors typically
have never been interested in pooling their funds to jointly
finance a very large project. Most are very concerned with
issues of control. They are reluctant to turn over control
of their funds or their property to either a joint-venture
partner or to an investment advisory firm. Third, relatively
small projects on small parcels were considered easier to
assemble and get through the planning approval process.
Fourth, by their very nature smaller properties entailed less
risk to the institution. Finally, development financiers did
not feel there was much demand from tenants for very large
buildings. This last point is the one which institutional
investors liked to stress in defense of their real estate
investment decisions.
Regardless of the true causes behind the limitations on the
size of long-term real estate financing commitments in the
U.K., the system continued to work reasonable well until the
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early 1980's, when, new forces upset the traditional process.
First, institutions on their own or with the advise of
portfolio analysts began to cut back on real estate in order
to reduce that portion of their investment porfolio. More
and more money was channeled into corporate equities and
government-backed securities. Around the same time the
market for office space began to change as tenants sought
larger blocks of space within class-A buildings. The most
far-sighted developers perceived this shift in demand and
began to develop larger projects without long-term financing
commitments. Some of the earliest large projects (E100
million or greater) were financed by extremely rich
development entities which could essentially fund the
development themselves. But others were built with
commercial construction loans and only the hope of a
long-term financing scheme.
Two competing long-term financing schemes had emerged since
1984 and both were being pioneered at the time of this study.
The first involved the securitization of a project and the
sale of commercial paper, commonly in the form of
deep-discount bonds, preferred stock and common stock shares,
with varying risk and return profiles. This market was being
created by the large international investment banks. The E79
million syndication of Billingsgate/ Montagu House by
Goldman-Sachs in 1986 was the first application of this new
vehicle. The second scheme was one which was being promoted
by a number of London banks and large property services firms
such as Richard Ellis. It was a uniquely British product
known as Property Income Certificates (PINCs). This vehicle
took advantage of certain aspects of British property law in
order to create "unitized" shares in a large property's
income stream. Both schemes had generated vociferous
promotion by their proponents, and criticism by the opposing
camps. But, no matter which vehicle was finally adopted, it
seemed clear that the real estate finance market had
radically changed.
Planning
Planning within the City, especially during the past 10-20
years, had also been quite conservative. Relatively slow
growth in office space demand permitted the city planning
officials the luxury of slow review and approval of new
building proposals. Most planners in the City were averse to
any new construction proposals which required the destruction
of older Victorian buildings regardless of the older
buildings' architectural merit. They also opposed projects
that would alter the traditional scale of the City's urban
fabric.
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Not until 1985, with the deregulation of the London stock
market impending, and after a number of highly respected
planners had predicted that office demand in the City was
burgeoning and could not be met within the constraints of the
current planning restrictions, did the City of London
planners consider loosening their development restrictions.
It was between the time that the revised planning guidlines
were proposed and their eventual adoption into law in late
1985 that the Canary Wharf proposal was first made public.5
London Docklands Development Corporation
The London Docklands Development Corporation, created in
1980, was given the mandate to facilitate and promote the
economic redevelopment of approximately 8000 acres of
obsolete and abandoned dockland in the East End of London.
These docklands were primarily located on the north bank of
the Thames and extended from the Tower of London 12 miles
downriver.
The LDDC was granted a wide array of distinct powers and
attributes all designed to promote redevelopment. Perhaps
the most notable incentive was the establishment of an
economic Enterprise Zone on the Isle of Dogs in 1982. Within
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this zone, in the center of the Docklands, all property taxes
on new developments had been waived until 1992. In addition,
100 percent capital cost allowances were available in the
first year for all new construction. These allowances,
somewhat similar to U.S. investment tax credits, could be
used to offset U.K. taxable income. These features were
potentially worth millions of pounds in savings to property
developers.
The entire Docklands area also provided developers with
"one-stop" planning approval. The LDDC had superceeding
power over the planning agencies of the four greater London
bouroughs in which it was located and over all other planning
districts which might normally claim jurisdiction over
development proposals. A number of other onerous
requirements, restrictions and surcharges had also been
waived for potential development proposals in the area. The
only borough-imposed stipulation which still applied was that
all new structures conform to existing local building codes.
Economic incentives and the cutting of much bureaucratic red
tape led to rapid redevelopment of the Docklands. When
coupled with a very desireable location within the London
metropolis, substantial public infrastructure improvements
and the dynamic and charismatic leadership of Reginald Ward,
the Executive Director, the pace of the Docklands
rejuvenation was much faster than ever hoped.
Office Demand
Coincident with, and by no means independent of, this rapid
growth in London docklands real estate had been a tremendous
growth in office demand in the City. Much had been written
about the deregulation of the London stockmarkets in October
1986, which was commonly referred to as "Big Bang." But
commercial space demand by large banking and institutional
tenants had already started to grow substantially two to
three years before "Big Bang." This led rents to increase
rapidly in the five year period from 1982 to 1987.6
As real estate costs in the form of both rents and property
taxes began to rise sharply in the early 1980's, many tenants
in the City began considering moving some of their operations
out of the center of London. The newspapers were among the
first to relocate their production facilities to the
Docklands. Many other institutions followed. The first
tenants to move were usually "back-office" or blue-collar
production functions. Gradually, many small professional
firms also found themselves being driven out of the City by
high rents. Many of these companies soon discovered to their
delight that they could occupy class-A new space in the
docklands for less cost than the class-B space they abandoned
in the center city. This rent-induced displacement probably
did contribute substantially to the Docklands boom.
Relatively early in the Docklands rennaisance, many British
developers became excited about the prospect of housing back
offices and small professional firms in relatively
low-density new construction in the docklands. However, none
of them seem to have ever seriously considered luring the
front offices and headquarters of major institutions to a
high density development there. Many of them had been very
successful at completing and filling two- to six-story office
and light industrial structures in the Docklands, especially
in the Enterprise Zone. At the time of this writing, a
second generation of denser developments was also under
construction by local developers. These projects were
primarily mid-rise structures and were also speculative in
nature. However, there was still considerable doubt whether
the Docklands area could be a headquarters location versus
back office space.
Although most of the developers, chartered surveyors, and
planners in the City believed in June 1987 that the market
was still very strong and would continue to remain so for at
least the next few years, no rigorous econometric analyses
were available to substantiate their intuition. None of the
individuals that were interviewed knew of any current
research which projected future demand based on underlying
economic factors. Instead, these bullish demand reports were
sustantiated primarily by intuitive analysis of macroeconomic
factors or by extrapolation from survey interviews of various
large tenants. All of these bullish projections generally
concurred that the City would be able to absorb all of the
new space presently under construction while maintaining
healthy vacancy rates of less than five percent at least
through 1989 or 1990. But analysts were much more leery of
the vast number of new projects in the pipeline proposed for
completion in three to five years.
Current Development Strategy
If all of the projects currently granted preliminary planning
approval in the City were expidited and brought on line
around the same time, the market might very well be flooded
by 1991. For this reason and possibly others, most of the
"old-line" develoment companies in London presently seemed
willing to sit out most of the current development
opportunities. Instead, the new, large projects in the City
were being developed primarily by young and aggressive
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companies. The old, established companies appeared quite
willing to sit back and enjoy the extrordinary increases in
rents, cash flow and capital value which the current boom was
causing. They were still building an occassional project,
perhaps to keep their development staffs working, but their
current strategy seemed to be to accumulate cash and wait.
The consensus leader among the new, young developers was a
partnership known as Rosehaugh-Stanhope. This consortium was
led by a developer, Stuart Lipton, and a financier, Godfrey
Bradman. Their current flagship project was known as
Broadgate: an office and mixed-use project over British Rail
air rights at Liverpool Station. Built in multiple stages of
from 100,000 to 650,000 square feet between 1986 and 1990, it
was to total approximately 4,000,000 square feet upon
completion.
7
Broadgate set the standards for new London development in a
whole range of areas. Stuart Lipton had taken the
opportunity during the 1970's to spend a couple of years in
the United States and study U.S. development methods. He had
successfully imported fast-track construction techniques to
the English market and was acclaimed for setting records for
the brevity of his construction schedules. He had been
impressed by the quality of design and professional expertise
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of the large American design firms, and had commisioned
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill of Chicago to design the
majority of the Broadgate project. The marketing center at
the project site employed a state-of-the-art multi-media
presentation which was as impressive and glitzy as anything
currently in use in the U.S. The actual marketing of the
development started very early, was aggressive, and was
responsive to potential tenant's individual needs. As a
result of this approach, Broadgate had leased space or
garnered commitments from some of the largest investment
banking and trading firms in the City, at rents much higher
than originally projected.
Broadgate, while probably the leader in most of the new
development processes being implemented in the city, was by
no means the only American-style project currently under
construction or on the drawing boards. In 1987, more and
more developers were coming to terms with formerly
recalcitrant labor unions and the pace of the construction
process was markedly increased. They began to solve the
problems of financing which had previously limited project
size. The market began to accept pre-lease commitments, a
hitherto unknown and utterly untenable concept. Some space
commitments started to happen even before ground had been
broken for the project because the tenants realized that it
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could offer them additional leverage in a hot market and
could afford them substantial design imput. And, while the
new developers were successfully innovating, the City planners
were permitting more, larger, and more progressive projects.
Changing Market Conditions
The London development market changed a great deal between
1980 and 1987. It had grown a great deal more dynamic, more
innovative, more expedient, and more responsive to market
demands. It was growing more similar to that of the United
States and Canada. This change and growth of the London
development market would have major implications for American
and other foreign developers who would seek entry. Clearly,
the market now accepted a new, more innovative product.
Thus, foreign developers with expertise in this type of
product might have an advantage if they entered the market.
However, since real estate is a business where temporary
imbalance between supply and demand are often exploited
quickly, this window of opportunity for American, and other
foreign, developers could close just as rapidly. Any
temporary competitive advantage that American developers held
in terms of design, construction, finance, or marketing
expertise rapidly faded as U.K. developers quickly adapted to
changing market demands.
CHAPTER 3:
Canary Wharf, London, England: The Case
The Context
Canary Wharf is one of the largest, private commercial real
estate development ventures in the world and the first
attempt by American interests to develop a large-scale
commercial project in Europe. The site is located on the
former West India Docks, on the Isle of Dogs, approximately
three miles east of the City of London along the River
Thames.(see Exhibit 1.) The original master plans for this
71 acre site include a total of over 12 million gross square
feet of space with an estimated project budget of E3 billion
(approximately $4.8 billion).
Canary Wharf represents an optimistic attempt to meet tenant
demand in the City of London as it matures into one of the
three international financial centers in the world alongside
New York and Toyko. In October of 1986, London's stock
market was deregulated, culminating a five-year evolution of
the City's financial services industry. The deregulation had
been presaged by burgeoning growth in both the volume and the
number of players in London's Eurocurrency, Eurobond, and
Euronote markets. By 1985, the number of foreign banks with
sMAI Mws




Exhibit 1: Canary Wharf Location 8
offices or other represention in London had grown to 463,
exceeding the totals of both New York and Toyko. Over 200
domestic banks were also operating in the City. In addition,
the average daily volume of currency trading in London had
also begun to exceed the volume of both New York and Toyko
($60 billion according to an early 1985 survey by the Bank of
England). 9 The London Stock Exchange's "Big Bang" and
London's growing presence as an international financial
center had caused an incredible increase in demand for office
space by financial institutions.
The Henley Centre for Forecasting, the largest independent
research group in Europe, estimated in 1985 that the annual
average compound growth in the number of City of London jobs
could exceed four percent over the next ten years due to Big
Bang. If correct, that figure would translate into over
200,000 new City jobs, of which 60 percent would be in the
financial services sector.1 0
In addition to the amount of new office space needed to meet
the demand for projected employment growth, a new type of
office space was needed as well. The large financial
conglomerates seeking to do business in London required
sophisticated office space, and they prefered that it be all
under one roof. Buildings which met the needs of these
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tenants needed greater floor-to-ceiling heights to accomodate
the cabling and HVAC systems necessary to support new
technology, large open-spanned floor spaces for trading
floors, and links to sophisticated telecommunications
networks.
In early 1985, it seemed implausible that the City of London,
specifically the historic center known as the "Square Mile,"
could accomodate either the quantity or the type of space
required by these financial conglomerates. Historic
conservationists and city planners had made development
difficult in the city. Large developable sites were very
difficult to secure, and if sites were secured, planning
constraints prevented the amount of floor area that could be
built. Into this dynamic market stepped the Canary Wharf
Development Company.
The Genesis of the Project
Canary Wharf was first envisioned as a potential office site
in early 1985 by Dr. Michael von Clemm, then chairman and
chief executive officer of the London investment bank, Credit
Suisse First Boston. He was looking at the blighted
Docklands area as a site for a food processing plant for one
of his private restaurant ventures. But instead, von Clemm,
now chairman of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets,
serendipitously saw the derelict warehouses, with large floor
spaces, as possible trading floors for CSFB's growing London
office space needs. The possibility of developing office and
trading space to satisfy the requirements of financial
tenants on the Isle of Dogs within a couple of miles of the
London financial center, interested him enough to pursue the
idea further.
Von Clemm soon contacted Archibald Cox, Jr., Managing
Director of Morgan Stanley International, who was facing
similar problems satisfying Morgan Stanley's office and
trading space needs within the city. Cox did not share von
Clemm's initial optimism for the site. Instead, he argued
that substantial improvements to the area's infrastructure,
especially the road and rail networks, would be required to
successfully develop financial offices on the Isle of Dogs.
Cox also felt that two to three million square feet of office
space was required to achieve the critical mass, necessary to
justify these infrastructure expenses. However, both of the
firms' space needs were significant enough for the idea to
advance to the next stage.
The primary lure of the site was probably the preexistence of
the London Docklands Development Company (LDDC). To
proponents such as the LDDC, the Docklands area represented
the logical direction of city growth over the next few
decades. The vast amount of land and water area within this
industrial wasteland provided an exciting urban redevelopment
opportunity in light of London's present and projected
employment and residential growth. The Docklands area was
not without problems, however, particularly in terms of
access. But the LDDC and the Department of Transportation
had planned to commit huge sums to the area's infrastructure,
including over E500,000,000 ($800,000,000) on roads in the
Docklands. The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) was also
scheduled to begin operations in 1987 and it would provide
direct rail service to and from the City of London. Other
area transportation improvements would include the new London
City STOLport (Short Take-Off and Landing airport), which
would provide quick, direct service to many European cities
when it began scheduled operations at the end of 1987.11
In early 1985, von Clemm contacted G. Ware Travelstead to
obtain his imput on the project idea. Travelstead had been
educated as an architect but had never received his license.
He had, instead, formed his own interior architecture and
design firm, The Travelstead Group. Based in New York, they
specialized in investment bank trading space and other
high-tech corporate interiors. Travelstead had also been
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affiliated with First Boston International's real estate
division for nearly ten years, most recently as senior
property advisor. Later von Clemm would state that it was
Travelstead who conceived Canary Wharf as "the new
Jerusalem."12 By this he meant that Travelstead envisioned
the transformation of the design program for Canary Wharf
from being just a home for overflow office space for two
investment banks to the current master plan of 12 million
square feet of mixed-use, high-rise development. With this
vision to rally around a development consortium was
established.
The Organizational Structure
The Canary Wharf Development Company, was formed in 1985 as
an American consortium comprised of First Boston
International, The Travelstead Group, Credit Suisse First
Boston, and Morgan Stanley International. G. Ware
Travelstead, was chosen to head the consortium as Chairman.
Each of these players had somewhat different motives for
enlisting in the project, but they all shared two common
interests: the lure of substantial profits and the ability to
leverage the success of the project to increase their own
prestige in the real estate development field.
Each of the consortium members believed the precursor
elements of a profitable real estate venture were present.
The financial revolution in London had created a huge demand
for sophisticated office space and this demand was projected
to continue, unabated, for some time. It was also clear from
the experience of Credit Suisse First Boston and Morgan
Stanley that securing large amounts of sophisticated office
space in the City of London was difficult and would probably
remain so. In addition, the consortium members were
beginning to feel that having a downtown London address was
no longer critical in light of recent telecommunication
innovations. They felt that the huge influx of foreign
banks, which were then flooding into London, did not hold
strong, preconceived ties to center city locations.
In addition, the unique benefits of building under the
umbrella of the LDDC in the Enterprise Zone made the project
even more attractive to the consortium of investors. Working
in concert with the LDDC would give the American consortium
access to the local political knowledge and support that it
severely lacked. Of primary importance was the fact that the
LDDC would expedite the planning approval process. Given the
historic difficulty of this process in London and the
consortium's lack of local representation, this was
considered critical. The substantial (but temporary)
property tax and capital allowances which were available
within the Canary Wharf site were also assets which could be
utilized. With these benefits, coupled to Travelstead's
vision, they embarked upon an aggressive design and marketing
program in mid 1985.
A team of premier consultants was quickly assembled by the
development company. The Chicago office of Skidmore, Owings
& Merrill (SOM) was commissioned to execute the master plan
of Canary Wharf in conjunction with consulting architects
I.M. Pei & Partners, New York and associate architects YRM
Architects & Planners, London. SOM was also commissioned by
Morgan Stanley to design their building, while Credit
Suisse First Boston commissioned I.M. Pei for their
structure. The Canary Wharf Development Company also
commissioned Kohn-Pederson-Fox of New York to begin schematic
design of the first high-rise office tower which would reach
a height of 850 feet. James Stirling, a prominent UK
architect, was commissioned by the development company to
design a 500,000 square foot building for an unnamed
client/tenant.
Other members of the project design team included: landscape
architects, Hanna/Olin, Ltd., Philadelphia; their consulting
architects, The Sir Basil Spence Partnership, London;
transportation consultants, Steer, Davies & Gleave, Ltd.,
London; and, civil and structural consultants, Ove, Arup &
Partners, London. Bechtel Great Britain Ltd., London was
designated the construction manager. They were to oversee
the five largest construction companies in Britain: Taylor
Woodrow Construction; Costain UK; Laing Construction; John
Mowlem & Co.; and, Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons, which had been
organized into a joint venture, Canary Wharf Contractors, for
this endeavor. Leasing agents for the project included
Savills, Richard Ellis, and Fletcher King, three prominent
chartered surveying firms in London.
The Design Concept
The project was consciously designed to be of the highest
quality in all aspects. The design of the building
exteriors, the materials with which they were to be clad, the
layout of all public spaces and all of the amenities to be
provided to both the workers and the visitors to Canary
Wharf, were to rival the finest available anywhere in the
world. State-of-the-art building interiors and mechanical
systems were designed to flexibly accomodate changing tenant
needs. Planning of the site revolved around the desire to
create a new urban district which would appear to be a
natural evolution of traditional London city design, while
beneath the streetscape, a complex system of roadways, and
service areas would permit efficient operation of a dense,
new complex. The mix of uses in the project were also
arranged so as to promote both business efficiency and the
dynamic, spontaneous pleasures of a complex urban
environment.
To maximize the developable water frontage of the project and
to insure it's efficient operation, the entire complex was
organized around a six-story parking/service/circulation
spine which would rise to six stories. on top of this spine,
which crested at a height of approximately 80 feet above the
water, would be built the main roadways. This exceptional
height was dictated by a decision made early in the site
design process. The planners decided the development would
have to be built over the new elevated railway line which
crossed the site. Individual buildings built later would
"plug into" this service spine and have their main entries at
the "ground level" 80 feet above the water. (see Exhibits 2 &
3.)
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Exhibit 2: Canary Wharf Site Plan1 3
Exhibit 3: Canary Wharf Project Section14
Although the pro rata cost of this service core was
reasonable, given the total square footage to be built, the
design phasing dictated that a very large chunk of the
infrastructure (approximately E300 million, or $480 million)
be built first. 15 Some members of the design
team recalled being concerned about this but that the
developers assured them that their financial analysis showed
the project could still be funded with this design.
In addition to the large upfront costs of the site
infrastructure, the development company, as part of the
negotiations with the LDDC, had also pledged to contribute
E47 million ($73 million) to the budget for the construction
of a tunnel extending the new rail line to London's existing
subway system at Bank Station in the center of the city. 16
Because of the public perception of poor transportation
access to the site, both the LDDC and the project designers
considered this extention critical to the long-term success
of the development.
A high-speed water taxi service was also scheduled to
commence operations and provide direct access from the City
of London to the Docklands as soon as the first buildings at
Canary Wharf were completed. However, even with planned
improvements to the Docklands' transportation infrastructure,
many public and private critics felt that access to the
Canary Wharf site would be very difficult, especially during
the initial years following tenant occupancy. The
consortium's transportation consultant projected in 1987 that
for the Canary Wharf transportation access to work
effectively, 70 percent of all commuters would have to use
the rail system. The issue of accessibility to the site
continually threatened to become the project's Achille's
heel. There was little doubt among most of London's real
estate professionals that, in the long-run, the Docklands
area would become a thriving and successful commercial and
residential area. However, resolution of transportation
problems during the next few years, the crucial years for the
success of Canary Wharf, remained uncertain.
Critical Events
A turning point occured in early 1987 when the LDDC and the
Canary Wharf consortium announced that they would soon be
signing the project's Master Building Agreement (MBA). The
MBA represented the point of no turning back for the
consortium. When it was signed, title to the project site
would be conveyed to the developers in exchange for a E300
million commitment to assure the completion of the first
phase of the project and the £47 million commitment for the
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railroad extention. All of the parties were eager to sign
and get the project underway except for one problem; not one
prospective tenant had commited to leasing space. Even
Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse First Boston were waiting to
see if anybody else would be brought on board. The search
for tenant commitments and the signing of the MBA turned into
a "catch-22" situation. Prospective tenants were waiting to
see whether the development company was willing to commit
some serious money to guarantee that the project would be
built. The developers were waiting for lease commitments
before they would sign. What the development partners felt
was just good business sense, the public and the market began
to perceive as a case of cold feet.
To make matters worse for the consortium, since their project
had been announced in 1985, the City of London planners had
substantially loosened their planning controls. By 1987 a
flood of new project approvals in the City had some real
estate analysts beginning to suggest that there might be a
glut of new office space in London by 1990 or 1991. 17
In addition, in 1987, the Canary Wharf project no longer
stood alone as a lower-cost alternative to prime center city
locations. Following, or concurrent with, the Canary Wharf
initiative, many local developers began to build first-class
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office space in the Docklands and in the fringe areas of the
city. All of these projects were being designed to attract
sophisticated users with many of the same technological
advances planned for Canary Wharf. One such Docklands
project was London Bridge City, a 2.5 million square foot
office, retail, and residential project located on the
southern bank of the River Thames across London Bridge.
Begun in 1984, the second phase of this project was already
under construction in 1987. A similar successful
development, although not within the Docklands, was built by
Greycoat Development over the Victoria Station in the West
End. That site had also been considered an unacceptable
front office location until Salomon Brothers moved their
entire London office there in 1986. Phase II of the project
was scheduled to begin in 1988. Other projects within the
Docklands were to be located in the Royal Docks area,
adjacent the new London City Airport. At the same time,
Rosehaugh Stanhope and London & Edinburgh Trust, two
prominent UK developers, were competing for a major site on
the Royal Albert Dock. Rosehaugh Stanhope had proposed a
E750 million ($1.2 billion) office, retail, and marina
project for the site.18
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Mixed Motives
The profit motive, common among all of the partners in the
consortium was accompanied by a variety of other motives held
by the individual participants. Credit Suisse First Boston
and Morgan Stanley's primany interest was to satisfy current
and future office space needs. Their primary profit would be
realized through the substantial reduction in occupation
costs that Canary Wharf offered in comparison to rents in the
City. For them, profits and allowances from the development
deal were secondary. In the initial conception of the deal,
the opportunity for developmment rewards justified the risks.
However, as the deal grew larger and more complex, and as the
project delays due to the a lack of lease commitments
continued, it became apparent to both these investment banks
that the risks of the development deal were no longer
justified. By June 1987, both of the investment banks had
decided to withdraw from the development consortium, but they
had continued to maintain their verbal lease commitments to
the remaining partners, First Boston and Travelstead, if the
project went ahead.
The motives of First Boston International and Travelstead
also went beyond the initial profit incentive. Travelstead
must clearly have seen this as an opportunity to make a name
for himself within the international real estate marketplace.
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His company, The Travelstead Group, prior to this endeavor,
had never managed the construction or leasing of a commercial
project in the United States or anywhere else in the world.
They had acted as a consultant to First Boston on some of
their development site acquisitions. But they had always
relied on a real estate development partner to manage the
building and leasing phases. Many observers in both London
and New York speculated that this venture was an excellent
opportunity for him to create quite a name for himself within
the international development community and to generate
substantial net worth by leveraging the vast financial
resources of the other consortium members.
First Boston at the time of Canary Wharf's inception had also
very little involvement in commercial development. The firm
had a sizeable real estate investment portfolio, but the
majority of this portfolio consisted of completed commercial
office buildings in New York City. According to senior
executives affiliated with First Boston, the organization was
primarily interested in the Canary Wharf deal because it was
a unique opportunity to reap a considerable profit from the
unfulfilled office space demand within London's financial
community. However, they also acknowledged that their lack
of experience in new, commercial development, especially
development of this scale, led them to realize that they had
lacked a complete understanding of the complexities of the
deal. Unconfirmed reports from within the organization have
suggested that it was First Boston's senior administration
that eventually ackowledged that the consortium, as it was
then organized, might be unable to pull the project off.
They urged the operating partners to look for a new joint
venture partner who possessed significant development
experience.
In July 1987, it was announced that the consortium planned to
sell its interest in the project to the Canadian-based
development company, Olympia & York. One week later Olympia
& York signed the MBA with representatives of the LDDC.
Current Status
The status of the project, subsequent to the July 1987 sale
to O&Y, was uncertain. There was speculation that Olympia &
York would make substantial changes to the design of the
project. Possible changes included building lower towers,
reducing the height of the spine and restructuring the
phasing of the project to reduce the initial infrastructure
costs.
Initial reports in the real estate press speculated that the
substantial financial strength of O&Y, a privately-held
company with assets estimated to be worth US$7 to 10 billion
had allowed them the luxury of signing the MBA without signed
pre-lease commitments. In addition, they had considerable
experience to draw on having been the developers of a similar
project, World Financial Center, in Battery Park, New York.
CHAPTER 4:
Previous American Ventures in Foreign Markets
Two prominent London real estate consultants expressed the
notion that many previous forays by American developers into
London and other European markets may have come about
primarily due to the "ambiance factor." A common perception
of foreign real estate professionals was that American
developers were hasty in making the decision to attempt an
overseas development project. An example of these
perceptions might be something like this:
A successful American developer, enjoying his
newly-created wealth decides to "tour the Continent."
While he's there he gets the urge to visit the local
offices of his international real estate services
company. He mentions to the brokerage executives that
their city is quite beautiful and appears to have a
healthy development market. They assure him that times
have rarely been so good. When he asks about barriers
to entry by foreign players such as himself and is told
that there are no political or economic roadblocks to
speak of he begins to wonder, "why can't I grab a piece
of this action?"
"After all, I've made a ton of money in much more
competitive markets than this one. These guys don't
even know how to exploit market demand. Just look at
those vacancy figures of three to four percent. An
aggressive developer could make a bundle here. And by
using modern U.S. design and construction techniques I
could leave the local competition in the dust."
"Heck, if you've built one high-rise office building
you've built them all." He goes back to his hotel room
thrilled about the prospects for making a killing in
this market and a short time later calls the brokers
and instructs them to begin looking for a well-located
development site. And so begins a long and often
extremely frustrating venture.... 2 0
Although this was certainly not the case for all ventures
into foreign real estate markets, some American attempts at
developing competitive real estate projects overseas did
begin in such a manner. Cursory observations of selected
foreign cities and their real estate market would indicate
that a talented American developer could be capable of
building a very successful project there. However, success
has not been the norm. There appears to be substantial
obstacles to the entry of U.S. developers in foreign markets.
In the late 1960's, Paris development officials, both
public and private, saw the need for a substantial amount of
additional modern office space. Sensing that a high-rise
tower would both fit their needs and convey the image that
Paris was a modern international city, they sought out
American development expertise to help build a new commercial
landmark. Wylie Tuttle, a successful developer from the New
York development company of Collins, Tuttle and Company
embraced the opportunity, stating at the time, "Paris needs a
skyscraper and the competition here isn't as strong."21
He was invited to Paris by a consortium of both public and
private sector interests to build the Tour Montparnasse,
which at 52 stories, is still the tallest building in Paris.
Mr. Tuttle appeared quite skilled at the hard aspects of
high-rise construction and successfully completed his tower
on time and near budget.
He and his sponsors, however, were completely oblivious to
the cultural and political repercussions of their project.
Even at the time of this writing, twenty years later, the
building is considered by many Parisians to be the scourge of
the city skyline and, "American participation in the project
seemed to underline what many dreaded as an increasing
Americanization of the city."22 The tower's utter
insensitivity to the surrounding scale of the Left Bank was
one of the primary reasons for the French government in 1975
to ban any additional highrise construction in the historic
center of Paris. Instead, new highrise development was
strongly redirected to the perimeter of the city beyond its
historic boundaries. Most commercial high-rise development
subsequent to the Tour Montparnasse focused on La Defense, a
new urban center, five miles west of the city.
It was said that Tuttle also seriously misjudged the economic
realities of the French real estate market. Despite numerous
warnings that permanent debt-financing for such a project was
unheard of in France he proceeded through construction fully
intending to hold onto the building after its completion.
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Instead, the local naysayer's predictions held true and
eventually the tower was financed the same way most other
commercial rental property were financed at that time. The
building was converted into condominiums and it is now owned
by an assortment of investors. It is not known whether Mr.
Tuttle ever owned any of the condominium units. 23
In the mid 1970's Trammell Crow, a very successful developer
out of Dallas, Texas, also plunged into the Paris market. He
and his firm built two high-rise office towers on the
northeast side of the city near La Villette. Local real
estate professionals who were familiar with the projects
observed that although the towers were very well built and
quickly constructed, they took forever to lease. It
apppeared to them that the development company was oblivious
to the fact that their site was in a quarter of Paris which
had never been considered an acceptible office location. The
project appears to have been a financial failure and an
embarrassment to the development company.24
Trammell Crow was much more successful building a trade mart
in the early 1980's in Brussels, Belgium. This project has
approximately 1.4 million square feet of floor space and is
the largest commercial structure in Europe. Crow backed this
project financially and provided substantial design and
development consultation to their local joint-venture
developer.25 The project got off to a slow start but
eventually became a very substantial commercial success. Its
success seemed to be derived not so much from the economics
of the real estate development deal as from the developer's
participation in the sales generated by the tenants in the
wholesale market. Although this difference may seem trivial,
especially to those readers familiar with the standard
dynamics of an American retail project, it is not.
A critial factor in the success of this project and other
international ventures was the ability of the developer to
capture an untapped but willing market and capitalize on
specialized expertise derived from previous experience.
Crow's unrivaled knowledge in the design, construction and
lease structuring of trade marts, a building type in which
they had no European competition, allowed this. In addition,
this project was unique because it involved the management of
a business, similar to hotel development and management.
At the time a representative of the international division of
the Trammell Crow Company was interviewed, their strategy was
in two areas. First, the division sought trade mart
development opportunities in other European cities where
certain industries were concentrated or had major trade
centers. Trammell Crow recognized their development,
marketing, and management expertise in this product, although
due to the large size of these structures, but they also
sought local development partners in order to access local
knowledge. Second, they had recently assembled a small
portfolio of commercial real estate in Belgium and Germany
and they planned to expand these holdings. Accordingly, they
would established a local developer under the "Trammell Crow
umbrella" to build and manage these properties. Trammell
Crow prefered this strategy since local nationals "know local
business customs, know the language, and have the contacts."
Crow would provide financial, marketing, project and property
management assistance in these ventures. 2 6
Another group of American companies who had been active and
successful in the development of foreign real estate were the
large hotel companies: InterContinental, Hilton
International, Westin, Hyatt International, Sheraton, and
Marriott. Hilton International and Intercontinental Hotels
were companies formerly owned by large U.S. airlines which
recognized an unsatisfied demand for first-class hotel
accomodations in newly discovered travel destinations during
the 1960's and 1970's. Both strove to develop large business
and tourist hotels in major cities throughout Europe and the
world. More recently, both of the companies had been sold by
the airlines which originally directed their expansion.
Hilton International, like many other international hotel
companies, had become more of a management company than a
hotel development and investment company. Most large hotel
companies were publicly owned, and preferred to generate
management fees. These fees produced substantial "bookable"
earnings, as compared to hotel ownership, which often
produced lower earnings and substantial tax losses. The
parent company only maintained equity in the truly
exceptional hotels with excellent profitability. As part of
these hotel management agreements, the management company
would assist in the development and opening of the hotel and
then provide management, usually under long-term contract.
The management company occasionally sought the development
opportunity, but more often, others found the opportunity.
A representative of the development arm of Hilton
International suggested that over the years the company had
transformed into more of an international corporation than an
American company with foreign properties. Hilton
International had placed a large number of foreign nationals
in executive positions and had decentralized most of their
development decisions. Foreign nationals in their respective
countries now made most of the development and operations
decisions. These executives, including hotel general
managers and divisional officers, had extensive international
experience and contacts, and often were the source of deals
for the company.2 7
An example of limited American involvement in international
hotel development and ownership was American banks who were
swapping equity in South American hotels for non-performing
loans in those countries. Other instances of American real
estate development and investment includes large American
contractors (often defense-related) who were obligated to
invest some of their foreign currency in specific countries
in the Middle East.
Somewhat similar to the international hotel ventures have
been the foreign ventures of John Portman and Associates of
Atlanta. John Portman is both an architect and developer.
His architecture and engineering company had designed
overseas hotel and mixed-use projects for many years and his
development company had built urban mixed-use projects in the
U.S. prior to the decision to embark on similar foreign
development projects. Portman Overseas, a subsidiary
development company, created in April 1986, sought to
capitalized on John Portman's worldwide design experience and
reputation when seeking international development
opportunities, primarily in the Asian Basin. In mid-1987
they were concentrating their development efforts on Shanghai
Center, a $175 million mixed-use project in China.
Portman had provided design or development services on other
projects sites in Singapore and Malasia. These developing
nations, like China, were seeking to promote tourism and
continued commercial development. Representatives of the
Portman organization felt that development negotiations with
these host governments had often been quite extensive
especially when those governments had no experience with
Western businesses, real estate standards or practices.2 8
In, 1986, the international development division of Walt
Disney Enterprises commenced construction of a new Disney
theme park 25 miles east of Paris. Similar to the
development of Disney World in Orlando, the development
company had again secured control of a huge parcel of
approximately 4500 acres and they planned to develop a
substantial number of commercial projects around the 150 to
200 acre theme park.29 The precise terms of the development
agreement ironed out with the French government were not
available but it appeared that the government planned on
providing substantial new services to the site.
At this early stage in the development process it was
impossible to evaluate the success or profitability of this
venture. Most French real estate experts did feel that the
Disney company stood to reap enormous gains just from the
appreciation in the value of land surrounding the park.
Again, there were other important factors besides the
development expertise and experience of Disney with this
product. Disney also provided substantial experience in the
marketing and management of the unique venture, and thus
could utilize this expertise to secure international
investment opportunities.
Disney has also completed a Disney theme park in Toyko, using
its development and management expertise to establish a
foothold in this market. This project was similar to both
the Paris and Orlando parks in that the project included a
proportionate amount of perimeter land development,
especially for hotel and resort development projects.
Other American players active in development in Western
Europe included some of the large investment banks. First
Boston Real Estate's participation in Canary Wharf has
already been detailed. However, similar to the strategy of
the investment banks that were interviewed, First Boston
sought Canary Wharf as a unique investment opportunity, with
no other global implications. In addition, a representative
of Salomon Brothers reported that they have taken equity
positions in some projects in which they had raised capital
and had been impressed by the pro forma profit projections.
Salomon leaves the development management to the local joint
venture partner, often the entity that originally brought
them the deal for financing. Goldman-Sachs turned a few
heads and assumed a fairly high profile in London development
when they announced that they were willing to pay E92 million
for the redevelopment site on which they planned to build
their new headquarters. The economics of this deal were
seriously questioned by other London real estate experts. As
the sale was only announced in June 1987 and no construction
costs were divulged, analysis of this venture was not
possible.
More often than not real estate capital and expertise has
traveled west across the Atlantic from Europe to North
America and not the other way around. Lincoln Properties
Company of Dallas has a representative headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland who is attuned to the real estate markets
throughout continental Europe. However, his role has not
been to seek out European development opportunities for
Lincoln, a company nearly as large and diversified as
Trammell Crow, but rather to locate European sources of
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capital which will be used to fund Lincoln's North American
development ventures. When asked why Lincoln had not entered
a European market the financier stated quite succinctly, "We
prefer the market economies in the U.S." over the many
political and governmental controls in Europe.30 Lincoln's
experience in Europe provides valuable insight into the
central thesis question. Lincoln has had access to many
deals in Europe and obviously have access to local sources of
capital. However, the company has prefered U.S. investment.
As was previously mentioned, a considerable number of English
development companies and institutional investors have been
active in North American real estate markets for many years.
French construction companies with development subsidiaries
and various other European investors have also engaged in
projects in the United States. Two large London-based
chartered surveying firms, Jones Lang Wooton and
Richard-Ellis have established offices throughout the U.S.
and Canada to provide real estate brokerage and other
professional services. All of these organizations, to a
greater or lesser extent, felt that the real estate market in
America offered some opportunities unavailable in Europe,
including greater yields, more political stability, and more
solid market economies. It was, and continues to be, true
that North American developers pursuing opportunities in the
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opposite direction are swimming against the tide.
The New York office of Gerald D. Hines Interests, one of the
largest development companies in the U.S., seriously
considered entering the red-hot London development market in
1986. They went so far as to engage in three extended visits
during which time their London development team performed
extensive analysis of the market and found a potential
redevelopment site which was available for purchase.
However, when it came time to commit to the proposal they
declined, and instead handed the opportunity off to a local
developer with whom they had joint-ventured previously in the
U.S. Explaining the logic behind this decision a
representative of Hines said that upon objective analysis of
both the profit opportunity and the corporate resources
(primarily in the form of personnel) which would be involved
in the project it became clear that far greater opportunities
still existed for them in the New York market. Had they
decided to pursue the project they had no doubts, he said,
that they would have succeeded. But the New York market was,
and seemed as if it would continue to remain, more
lucrative.
31
This representative went on to add that this didn't mean that
all American development companies were better off staying in
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their own backyard. Some might be well-suited for a venture
in London. However, those would probably be the companies
who were more used to doing London-sized developments, who
could capitalize on strong knowledge of similar projects, and
whose home markets had gone soft. He agreed that if the
Washington market slowed down a developer from there might be
very successful in London. This may be due to the fact that
Washington developers have experience in developed,
competitive markets with smaller buildings and more stringent
planning constraints.
From the examples just outlined, we found it impossible to
stereotype previous American forays into foreign real estate
markets. It also seemed clear that potential pitfalls were,
and continue to be substantial. We have no doubt that
lucrative development opportunities exist, but the more
foreign the development environment, the more rigorous the
research should be prior to commiting to what on the surface
seems like a sure-fire deal.
CHAPTER 5:
Analyzing Foreign Markets and Development Opportunities
It is clear from the Canary Wharf case, and other testimony,
that foreign real estate development ventures are more
complex and therefore more risky than local endeavors. The
sources of additional risk in these projects are many. On
the broadest level, considerable additional risk is generated
by the structural differences in the development arena
itself. Even the United Kingdom, a country very similar to
the United States, has basic differences in procedural,
cultural, and financial systems commonly employed in their
native development projects. Other countries' traditional
systems are even more formidable.
Developers, eager to enter a hot new market, frequently
underestimate these differences and overestimate their
ability to understand and adjust to them. Detached analysis
of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the individual
firm is critical to minimizing this risk. Foreign markets
are already populated with competitors who have their own
strengths and weaknesses. Prospective new players must
analyze how their skills compare to local competition. The
complexities and additional risks associated with overseas
projects must be assessed in addition to market and financial
analysis which is required of any real estate development
project.
Part I of our analysis addresses the additional risks
associated with foreign development projects. Part II
presents a logical self-evaluation process for the American
developer seeking overseas ventures. This process includes
an analysis of foreign perceptions and the means available to
obtain sufficient local market knowledge. Part III presents
a comparative analysis of American development skills versus
foreign competition.
Part I: NON-DEVELOPMENT RISKS
It is often stated that throughout the United States, real
estate is a local business. This is true in other countries
as well. Any developer entering a foreign market must strive
to understand the effect that local culture, politics, taxes,
regulations, finance, planning, and labor will have on the
success of their project. This is not to say that foreign or
novel approaches to any of the afforementioned areas will not
succeed. But, a basic understanding of the cultural aspects
of a market, including possible attitudes toward alternative
64
schemes, will greatly aid in correctly estimating the chances
of a project's success.
American developers, accustomed to working in the dynamic
American marketplace, may overestimate the willingness of
foreign markets to accept new, and often time brash
proposals. Trammell Crow has been exposed to both sides of
this issue. Their Paris office towers failed for much the
same reason that the Brussels Trade Mart succeeded. Both
projects sought to radically alter the market, yet one was
accepted very differently from the other. Non-developmental
cultural issues may have been responsible.
Culture
Cultural differences exist within different areas of the
United States and become apparent when developers attempt to
build projects away from their home base. The cultural
differences that exist throughout Europe and the rest of the
world are much more pronounced.
The Canary Wharf Development Company (CWDC) took advantage of
the many cultural similarities between the U.S. and the U.K.
Problems arose, however, from their unsuccessful adaptation
to the more inflexible aspects of English culture, tradition,
and standard business processes. Many Englishmen attributed
this to American arrogance, but the CWDC's approach,
particularly the promotion of the project, would not have
appeared arrogant to most other American development
companies. Selling the "sizzle" of a project is an
established American tradition. In the U.S., marketing
enormous development schemes is usually more style than
substance, especially in the initial stages, in order to keep
the project moving forward in the political arena.
Unfortunately, a major flaw in the consortium's effort was
their failure to recognize that U.K. customs and culture look
unfavorably on marketing hype combined with project delays.
On the other hand, without such brazen tenacity and optimism,
the project may have never made it past the concept stage.
Foreign developers often need to seek local joint venture
partners in order to secure credible local knowledge in the
feasibility and approvals stages. In foreign markets, as in
the U.S., it is often a prerequisite to establish a political
foothold. The London Docklands Development Corporation
(LDDC) provided a base of local knowledge for the Canary
Wharf Development Company. This was mostly in the form of
planning assistance. The goodwill of the LDDC alliance did
little to help clear the other crucial hurdle; securing prime
tenants for the first buildings.
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Political Change
Investment markets consider the United States the safest
political haven in the world. This is evidenced by the
strength of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds sold throughout the
world and the increasing amount of foreign investment in the
U.S. Commercial development opportunities in other countries
may contend with substantially greater political risks. Any
prospective foreign development project should be preceeded
by a thorough analysis of political risk. This risk may be
in the form of extreme political changes as is often the case
in developing countries. Or, it may involve less drastic
political changes due to the election of a new controlling
party with a different political and social mandate. Both of
these examples will affect a foreign real estate venture.
Political risks may manifest themselves in foreign exchange
rates. Exchange rates, and their comparative volatility, can
be an extremely important factor in offshore ventures. The
strength of the U.S. dollar versus foreign currencies can
cause signficant changes in world money markets. Exchange
rates are even more important in real estate ventures due to
the long-term nature of the deals. Major international banks
currently offer means to manage or hedge exchange rate risk,
however these methods are costly and rarely offer long term
security. A rigorous analysis of exchange rate risk in a
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target market, and the factors that influence this risk, is
crucial when considering overseas real estate development
projects.
Taxes and Other Regulatory Issues
Taxes and other financial regulations related to real estate
development differ throughout the world. France, for
example, has a 18.6 percent registration tax on real estate
transfers. These can have a serious effect on the liquidity
and the market value of a real estate investment. In some
countries legal limits are set on the amount of profit that
can be withdrawn. Developers are restricted to maintaining
their capital in these countries. Other foreign countries
have special taxes on profits earned by foreign interests.
Differing foreign tax structures and business laws compound
the difficulty of assessing projected returns from foreign
real estate investments. Rigorous preliminary analysis of
additional tax constraints involved in a foreign deal is
essential.
Financing
The financial structure of a foreign development market is
often directly linked to the tax and regulatory climate,
particularly those regulations affecting banks and fiduciary
trusts. Projects in the U.K. were scaled down to the
regulatory limits imposed on British financial institutions.
Foreign developers seeking to enter new markets must be aware
of local financing sources, and the limits investors will
place on development projects. Otherwise, developers must
bring sources or methods of funding with them. Obviously,
funds must be available at rates which will maintain a
reasonable rate of return for the project.
Planning and Attitudes Toward Development
Related to politics, but more project specific, are the
planning systems and the general attitudes toward development
found in any overseas market. It is impossible to catagorize
planners and public administrators as being pro- or
anti-development based solely on their political
inclinations. In the case of Canary Wharf, some of the most
vociferous proponents of the project were the far left-wing
planners in the Borough of Tower Hamlets. They knew this
huge project would have some negative effects on the
surrounding community, but they also recognized that it would
shift growth eastward, counter to the traditional direction
of growth in London. Eventually, it would lead to better
transportation and government services in their area.
Similarly, Portman Overseas believed that communist China was
serious about promoting Western-style economic development
and that they will allow Portman to generate reasonable
profits from the development of Shanghai Center. On the
other hand, the French have decided to prohibit additional
high-rise construction in the heart of Paris. They are also
reluctant to allow the demolition of any existing structures
in the center of Paris. London planners had a similar policy
until market forces caused them to loosen restrictions and
expedite the approval process.
When evaluating the underlyimg planning environment in any
potential market, developers should understand that the
actions of planners and politicians reflect social goals.
Developers must strive to understand the underlying motives
of these individuals in order to avoid potential pitfalls.
Critical questions concerning specific planning policies
should be reviewed, including current government attitudes
towards foreign developers. These are not questions that are
easily answered, particularly by consultants. They require a
level of sophistication that can test the top officers in any
organization.
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Construction Labor and Management
Local factors which can greatly affect the decision to pursue
a development project are labor relations and construction
management. London, and all of England up until a few years
ago, had a very bad reputation for its construction workers.
Unions controlled the workplace and were considered overpaid
and intransigent. Developers told horror stories of projects
which took years longer than comparable, or larger, foreign
projects. Recently a number of aggressive U.K. developers
have proven the critics wrong. Stuart Lipton of Rosehaugh
Stanhope led a new wave of local developers who have imported
American construction management and fast-track design
methods. They have created a process in which English labor
and English contractors are now building projects as quickly
as most are built in the U.S. The Canary Wharf consortium,
aware of the criticism of English contractors' inability to
deliver large projects on time, may have been guilty of
overkill when it created a consortuim of the five largest
contractors in the U.K. to be the general contractor for the
project and then hired Bechtel as construction manager.
All real estate development projects require exhaustive
market and financial feasibility analysis. Risks must be
assessed and strategies must be devised to manage as many of
these risks. Additional risks associated with foreign
markets compound the difficulty of this process. Any
developer considering foreign markets should evaluate all of
these additional risk factors in order to project a
reasonable rate of return. Rational investment decisions
cannot be made until all of the above risks are taken into
account.
Part II: EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT SKILLS
Many American development companies have specific skills
which give them a distinct advantage in many foreign real
estate markets. Yet local market knowledge and reputation is
still a huge competitive advantage for the local developer.
In evaluating whether to engage in an overseas venture, it is
crucial to evaluate if the competitive advantage of
possessing these skills offsets the disadvantage of having a
lack of local knowledge and recognition.
Strong Suits
The developer must objectively assess their skills and
expertise before entering a foreign market, including which
skills or previous development experience they wish to
exploit in this new market. The Canary Wharf Development
Company believed they could create a high-rise office center
in an area where local competitors only saw a blighted
wasteland. They may have been correct. They also believed
they could design and manage sophisticated office space
better that local developers. This is much more doubtful.
Finally, they felt they could dominate the market in new
state-of-the-art office and financial trading space. This
third premise was clearly naive and incorrect.
Foreign Perceptions
How the foreign market perceives the new developer's skills
is as important as the developer's own assessment. Americans
entering almost any foreign market will be preconceived as
"doers". That is an international image and a preconception
that may be helpful in inspiring market confidence. Yet it
may also lead inadvertently to unreasonable expectations.
This problem clearly plagued the Canary Wharf proposal. At
some point, faith in the project began to slip when public
expectations were not satisfied. To American developers
experienced with the complexities in attempting to begin
construction of a 12 million square foot, mixed-use project,
a two-year start-up period is not unreasonable. But the
English press, politicians and public did not understand what
was involved in developing a project of this scale. All they
knew was that Travelstead originally stated that construction
would begin in early 1986 and as of July 1987, nothing had
been built.
Other foreign preconceptions might be advantageous. For
example, many Western European nations are very interested in
rejuvenating the urban core of their second-tier cities, such
as Manchester and Liverpool in Britain and Marseille and Lyon
in France. Instead of infusing massive amounts of public
money, the governments of these countries are interested in
implementing American-style programs which harness market
forces and private initiative in concert with public planning
support. Partners for Livable Places of Washington D.C. has
been quite active in continental Europe and England for the
past few years, extolling the virtues of American-style
public-private partnerships. Representatives of this
organization think American developers with urban
redevelopment experience would be greatly welcomed in such
cities.
The ability to negotiate with public planning authorities is
another skill which the more comtemporary planners and other
public officials in the U.K. seem to expect from American
developers. Depending on who is asked, Americans may also be
expected to create more exciting urban spaces, more
self-conscious architecture or use alternative sources of
financing. None of these preconceptions are necessarily bad
nor are they notions the prospective developer must seek to
dispell. Developers should be aware, however, that their
reputation may preceed them and it may dramatically effect




It would be naive for any developer to believe that they can
gain a strong understanding of a foreign market in a short
amount of time without local representation. The Canary
Wharf venture ran into problems that reflected an ignorance
of the local culture. And this was a venture in a country
whose culture is relatively similar to that of the United
States.
Large international real estate services firms may be a good
source of knowledge on local markets but their motives may
not be consistent with those of the developer. Their
optimistic consultation regarding a foreign market's
development opportunity may actually be motivated by an
expectation of a much more lucrative exclusive leasing
contract. These firms may also be so large that they will
not readily offer personalized consultation. Their
assistance will be more generic. Therefore, they may not
treat matters such as cultural differences, political risk,
or planning constraints with the same objectivity as a
development partner.
Hiring local nationals who have recognized expertise in a
foreign market, as professional staff, may prove difficult.
Even if talented individuals can be found and lured away from
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their current endeavors, this may represent a larger
commitment to a project and an individual than a prospecting
development company is willing to initially make. Making
significant employment commitments prior to initiating a
project in a new market can be costly.
A joint venture between a large foreign developer and a local
development representative, or development company, is an
arrangement where commmon goals and objectives are more
likely shared. In the foreign ventures that we examined, one
of the most common formulas for success was for a foreign
firm to complement their strengths and weaknesses through a
joint venture agreement.
One final option is to form a quasi-partnership with a local
redevelopment agency. This arrangement is similar to the
Canary Wharf project. The public agency can expedite
political and planning approval, aid in the assemblage of
land targeted for urban renewal, mandate tax writedowns or
other abatements, or, help secure low-priced financing.
However, their goals may not always run parallel to those of
the development company. They may want to expedite a project
for political reasons rather than market need, they may not
fully understand that projects must ultimately be leased at
profitable rates, or, they may not be able to devote the same
degree of attention to specific projects as a development
partner. Consequently, it must always be kept in mind
that having political support from a public agency does not
protect a development company from all of its development
risks. It may in fact increase the political risks.
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Part III: EVALUATING THE COMPETITION
The following analysis compares the development skills of
American developers and their foreign counterparts. It is
based on our review of the Canary Wharf project and other
American attempts at overseas development. It also includes
feedback from numerous personal and telephone interviews
conducted with individuals familiar with international real
estate development. The following skills are examined and
compared: project conception and market analysis; design;
planning and approval; financing; construction; marketing and
promotion; leasing; and property management.
Project Conception and Market Analysis
A skill which the best American developers demonstrate
exceedingly well is the ability to identify market
opportunity. Successful developers worldwide have this
talent. However, the most visionary Americans tend to not
only see an opportunity, but also to maximize these benefits.
Developers which come to mind in this regard include James
Rouse, Gerald Hines, Donald Trump, and the Disney Company.
This vision and follow-through has enabled some of the best
American development companies to create successful projects
where such a project had never even been considered. This
vision, sometimes unyielding and driven by ego and greed, has
a downside as well. It has also caused many reckless
developers to fail in their initial attempts.
In general, the United States does not have the planning
constraints found in most European cities. Many cities in
the U.S. embrace large development proposals to promote
economic and employment growth. Aside from the cities that
promote more stringent planning policies such as Boston, San
Francisco and New York, developers have been able to build
projects without much regulatory pressure. Consequently,
American developers are not accustomed to, or willing to be
turned down by regulatory agencies. Similarly, many American
developers have a reputation for their tenacious attitude in
not accepting defeat and will do anything within the
political system for approval of their projects.
In response to a relatively open-minded market, American
developers have been more aggressive in their creation of new
development schemes. New approaches often lead the world
market and set new trends and precedents in real estate
development. Examples of this include festival marketplaces,
intensive urban mixed-use projects, specialty retail centers,
and four-season full-service resort development.
This willingness of American developers to identify and
promote new and different approaches to development was
demonstrated in London. Canary Wharf represented a classic
American development proposal in that it was a bold move to
create a new financial center outside the established
financial core. It also typifies American efforts insofar as
it is an urban redevelopment opportunity and a public-private
partnership which involved extensive negotiations and
exactions. Projects of this scale with enormous amounts of
privately-funded infrastructure have been seen previously in
commercial development projects in the U.S. and Canada.
Although Ware Travelstead lacked the development expertise
necessary to complete the project, he should be commended for
the vision that fostered Canary Wharf.
Much reference was made in personal interviews to American
developers who "maximize opportunity" and the American "can
do approach" to development. Most interviewees discussed
American experience with larger, more complex projects and
higher risk preferences. American knowledge and experience
with urban redevelopment was also discussed by many
individuals. However, many interviewees confirmed our
observations that many U.K. developers had already begun to
adopt an "American approach" to real estate development.
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Representatives from two prominent U.K. development companies
stated that they had learned very much from America through
direct experience in its real estate markets.
In contrast to their ability to maximize a development
opportunity, especially when compared with their foreign
competition, many American development companies exhibit a
general weakness in the area of market analysis. They seem
to rely on their optimism, and believe their product will
outperform the competition. This tendency to disregard
market information and build without proper analysis,
sometimes referred to "cowboy development" in the U.S., would
be extremely dangerous in foreign markets.
Design
American developers, in conjunction with their efforts to
propose and build larger commercial structures, often promote
the most contemporary architectural design. They also base
many of their building design decisions on tenant needs and
preferences. The competitiveness of the U.S. market has
caused this awareness of tenant need in building design.
Neither of these attributes have historically been the case
with developers in London and other European cities.
Planning constraints as evidenced in London, and in most
European cities, could inhibit the kinds of bold design that
Americans are accustomed to. More emphasis is placed on
contextual design in London, and in most European cities,
than in U.S. markets.
Canary Wharf represents an excellent example of design based
on the building requirements of financial sector tenants and
the use of bold design in the promotion of a development.
But much of this design expertise came from the design
professional, not from the developer. In a competitive
market, the foreign developer can contract just as easily
with American design professionals as an American developer.
This was currently the case with many projects in London.
Not only do some U.K. developers realize the competitive
advantage that the American design professional gives their
project, American firms are eager to export their services.
Trying to corner the market in progressive project design
would be futile in most foreign markets.
Planning and Approval
London, Paris, and other European cities generally do not
mandate that the developer pay exactions for transportation
improvements, affordable housing, or public open space in
exchange for receiving approvals. However, in contrast to
North America, most European cities exhibit very stringent
planning controls. This may be because planners in these
cities realize that their cities are much older, more
fragile, more developed, and have more historical
significance. For instance, in most European cities, a
100,000 square foot building in the central business district
is still a very large building. It is extremely difficult to
develop large buildings in the center of many European
cities. Developers have resorted to the fringe areas in
order to meet demand for larger tenant spaces.
Canary Wharf provided an excellent illustration of American
willingness to negotiate with governmental agencies and
assist in the funding of public infrastructure improvements.
Interviewees generally concurred that a local developer would
not have attempted to guide a tranportation improvement
through Parliament. This was lauded as an incredible feat,
especially since the bill was initiated by a foreign
consortium. Also, most felt that the willingness of American
development companies to pay large sums toward infrastructure
improvements, thereby assuming even greater financial risk,
was exceptional.
Financing
American developers have grown accustomed to using an
expanding array of real estate development finance methods to
fund large development projects in the United States.
American financial institutions have been relatively quick to
create and provide alternative sources of financing including
accruing and participating mortgages, mortgage-backed
securities and zero-coupon bonds. Therefore, American
developers and financial institutions who understand and are
already familiar with the costs and benefits of complex
financing schemes, may currently have an advantage over more
conservatively financed foreign ventures.
The ability of American development companies to arrange
large amounts of debt and equity financing for large and
complex development projects, however, is no longer a
competitive advantage. European developers now have access
to the same long-term funding sources as Americans.
Rosehaugh Stanhope arranged medium-term financing from a
number of commercial banks for the three million plus square
foot Broadgate office project at Liverpool station in London.
They are currently considering long-term financing with
mortgage-backed securities issued through the Euromarkets.
The Canary Wharf project differed from most foreign
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commercial development because of the extensive amount the
pre-construction and infrastructure costs associated with the
first phase of the project. Prior to the sale to Olympia &
York, financing of this initial phase was looked upon
sceptically by local real estate professionals. None of the
U.K. institutions that were interviewed expressed a desire to
participate in this type of project. Projects such as this
would require extensive equity funding from internal sources
to cover the lengthy pre-construction period. In large
projects such as Canary Wharf, sufficient capitalization of
the developer is crucial in order to successfully finance and
complete the venture.
Only a few North American developers appear capable of
funding projects of this scope. This may create a
competitive advantage for these developers. Olympia & York's
purchase of the Canary Wharf development rights and their
willingness to sign the Master Building Agreement, thereby
committing to provide substantial infrastructure funding
without pre-lease commitments, is evidence of this. Olympia
& York exhibited similar financial strength at a critical
jucture in a similar project when they agreed to guarantee
the state revenue bonds issued in conjuction with the Battery
Park City project in New York.
Construction
American development companies have embraced new construction
techniques, employing new methods pioneered both at home and
overseas to save construction time and expense. Construction
management techniques developed in the U.S. have been studied
and adopted by progressive development and construction
companies worldwide. These new project management techniques
allow very large urban commercial projects to be
fast-tracked. This can substantially reduce construction
time and save considerably on construction interest and other
overhead expenses. The larger Japanese construction
companies and a few of the larger European companies also
utilize construction management and promote the use of novel
fast-track techniques.
The Canary Wharf project was to employ a consortium of the
largest U.K. contractors, managed by the American firm
Bechtel. Fast-track techniques would allow $500 million of
initial infrastructure and the first phase of buildings to be
built in 27 to 30 months. The cost savings and marketing
benefits available from significant construction streamlining
such as this had spurred other development projects in
London, most notably the Broadgate development by Rosehaugh
Stanhope, to adopt fast-track construction methods.
Developers of large commercial projects throughout the world
now have the option of hiring an international construction
management company or a local construction company with
advanced skills to take advantage of these cost-saving
techniques. Many interviewees in Europe felt there were
benefits in using construction management, fast-tracking and
advanced construction techniques on larger commercial
projects. But not all of the foreign developers that were
interviewed seemed comfortable using novel construction
management or methods. A few, select European firms had
openly embraced these new methods. London & Edinburgh Trust
had also begun to utilize fast-track construction methods at
L'Anjou, a new office development in Paris. But the pace of
adoption, especially in less dynamic markets, was slow. In
these markets it appereared that an aggressive American
development company could build projects faster than most of
their local competition.
Marketing and Promotion
American developers are skilled in marketing and promoted
aggressive development schemes. They have demonstrated in
the U.S., and to some degree already in Europe, that new
building types and development concepts can be introduced
into established markets. Examples of sucessful,
highly-promoted, U.S. projects include urban festival
marketplaces, specialty retail centers and large-scale
resort/residential communities. European examples of unique
American development include the Brussels Trade Mart
developed by Trammell Crow and the EuroDisney development
east of Paris.
The Canary Wharf Development Company promoted its project
extensively. Their marketing and promotion program deserves
much credit considering the immense political and regulatory
obstacles that stood in the way of the project. The Canary
Wharf marketing campaign had to be as extensive as possible
to convince sceptics that a project of this scale could be
developed in the Docklands.
Just prior to the sale to Olympia & York, most interviewees
were willing to acknowledge the skillful way in which the
development company had promoted the project and brought it
to its current stage of development. But they expressed much
scepticism regarding the consortium's ability to secure lease
commitments and sign the MBA. Many interviewees, including
those very knowledgeable with large scale commercial
development, in light of the numerous delays, had come to
doubt whether the project would ever be built.
Leasing
The competitiveness of most American real estate markets, and
the current problem of oversupply in many of these markets,
has forced many American developers to devise, refine and
employ creative leasing and marketing techniques. In
contrast, very low historic vacancy rates in most European
cities have fostered relatively staid leasing programs. But
when the leasing climate changed dramatically in London,
brokerage skills evolved rapidly as well.
The Canary Wharf leasing program was aggressive. At the time
we conducted our research, the consortium's leasing effort
had been under way for over two years. They had contacted
thousands of companies throughout London, seeking to
determine their interest in tenancy in the initial phase of
the project. The consortium had published extensive
promotional material, including large advertisements in
European business magazines. The consortium had also
retained three of London's best chartered surveyors as
leasing agents. But they were up against stiff competition
from other projects in a very hot market.
The consortium's leasing effort tended to underestimate the
unwillingness of most U.K. firms to commit to lease space
prior to construction. Pre-leasing had not been common in
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the London market. Some pre-leasing had occured recently.
This had been in response to the recent increase in demand,
but it had only occured in the most desirable office
locations. London tenants still preferred to see
construction in progress, especially in more risky areas such
as the Docklands, prior to signing lease commitments.
Prospective tenants for projects such as Canary Wharf often
shared a great skepticism as to whether the project would
ever be built. Canary Wharf's leasing team was unable to
overcome this basic, cultural aversion to pre-leasing risk.
Property Management
Many commercial development projects, especially complex,
mixed-use developments, require that their developers possess
extensive property management skills. Some of the American
companies present in foreign real estate markets are
capitalizing on their previous experience in the development
and the management of these projects. Assuming market
acceptance, American developers who have experience in
building and managing retail or mixed-use projects may be
able to successfully implement projects of this sort in
foreign markets.
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The current situation of oversupply in many American real
estate markets has led to an increased awareness of the
importance of responsive property management. American
developers are emphasizing dilligent property management to
keep tenants in their buildings. Different market conditions
throughout Europe, including low office vacancy rates and
smaller commercial structures, have allowed many European
building managers to place less priority on property
management and tenant service.
Project Management and Market Experience
Much of our analysis has focused on possible competitive
advantages for American developers in foreign real estate
markets. These American development skills are acquired from
exposure to and experience with the complex, dynamic, and
sophisticated real estate markets in the United States. They
are not necessarily due to the fact that Americans are better
developers. Some American development skills also stem from
exposure to and experience with more complex building
projects. Foreign developers active in the U.S. and Canada,
in response to the competitive market, have adopted American
development techniques and compete very well with American
developers.
As foreign real estate markets evolve and become more similar
to each other throughout the world, the distinctive
development skills of American companies will become less
unique and less exploitable in overseas markets. Each new
window of opportunity for a progressive development company
in a new market will close more quickly. Success in a new
market will then depend on having both innovative products
and services and the ability to respond rapidly to changing
market needs.
In addition to those just analyzed, there may also be risks
with personnel. In some instances, it may be impossible to
find ample information on all the important individuals and
organizations who will be involved in an overseas project.
One reviewer termed this "the tall, dark stranger with the
charming foreign accent" factor. References will be hard to
obtain or of questionable quality unless the entire project
team is flown in from the U.S. This is one of the unique
risks which must be accepted in every foreign deal.
American development companies have accepted the additional
risks of foreign ventures in the past. Some have been very
successful while others have not. Early, broadly-scoped
research, followed by the formation of a realistically
structured development team with well-written agreements can
be key. Always, potential rewards must be commensurate with
the additional risks. In essense, a foreign development
venture should be analyzed the same way any potential
business venture should be analyzed: coolly, realistically,
and thoroughly, with optimism that problems can be overcome
but always with the willingness to say "no" if the risks
are not justified by the potential rewards.
CHAPTER 6:
Conclusions and Recommendations
American development companies seeking to enter foreign
markets must be willing to undertake more rigorous research
than usually required of projects in their home market.
Besides conducting extensive market and financial analysis,
analysis of a prospective foreign venture will entail
exploration of a host of novel factors which will make the
project's management more complex, more intensive, and more
costly. This final chapter summarizes this process, and
offers recommendations to American and other foreign
development companies who may seek to develop property in
foreign countries.
Local Knowledge
The initial step for the development company is to decide
whether or not they want to seek foreign development
opportunities. If the answer is yes, and the developer
believes that specific market and product opportunities may
exist, then the rigorous research process must begin. The
importance of local knowledge has been stressed throughout.
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The developer must learn the market(s) or ally with someone
who already has sufficient working knowledge. Small cultural
differences in the way business is transacted may make large
differences in a company's market success. Take for example
the subtle differences between doing business in the United
States and the United Kingdom. The developer must understand
the complexities of the local market in both the most general
and the most specific terms.
culture
Through knowledge of local market complexities and cultural
prejudices, the developers can determine how the market will
respond to their product. Some cultures may welcome
progressive development schemes while others may never adapt
and adopt them. The developer must understand that many
foreign markets do not adapt as easily to new products as the
United States.
Other Non-Development Issues
The American developer must understand the additional risks
inherent in a foreign venture. Non-development issues may
prevent entry of any foreign developer even when strong
development opportunities exist in a market. Currency risk,
political risk, taxes and capital export restrictions can
have drastic effects on projected yields, liquidity, and the
value of foreign real estate projects. These additional
risks can only be assessed through access to local knowledge,
thus reinforcing the need for extensive market research and
local representation.
Another important issue is the use of corporate resources for
these overseas ventures. Given generally smaller foreign
development projects, especially in most European markets,
the developer must determine if the potential returns from
overseas projects justify expending limited corporate
resources. Relocating corporate personnel in foreign markets
may be very inefficient given the size and the complexity of
the initial project. The developer must either undertake an
initial project of large scale to justify the existence of a
working office in that market, or they must make a long-term
commitment of corporate resources and capital.
Competitive Advantages, Skills, and Expertise
Any developer, in order to suceed, in a foreign market must
capitalize on their distinctive skills and expertise. These
skills may include the ability to undertake larger, more
complex development projects. This ability may be derived
from previous development experience or be based on a higher
risk preference in general. American developers also may be
able to capitalize on their marketing and promotion skills,
or their exceptional tenacity and ability to attack the
complexities of development projects from many angles, if
these are skills which differentiate them from their local
competition. Entering developers might also capitalize on
more basic development skills such as design, construction,
or finance, based on the specific overseas market conditions.
Prior experience in unique development projects, especially
those that required more intensive property management
skills, may give the American developer a temporary window of
opportunity in any foreign market, if the market will accept
this new product. All of these factors relate to monopoly
skills. Moving quickly to exploit innovation and temporary
imbalance between market supply and demand can produce
successful projects given market acceptance.
Rates of Return
A developer must insist on higher rates of return in foreign
markets to compensate for additional risks. However,
generally lower yields throughout Europe, and most other
parts of the world, suggest that higher rates can only be
derived when the developer has some sort of monopoly
advantage. This monopoly can be derived from taking
advantage of a temporary market imperfection, by developing
unique and innovative development projects, or by having
other advantages such as extensive experience, increased
knowledge, or less expensive sources of capital.
Appraising opportunities
Successful real estate development is the result of
well-formulated strategies, probing analysis and good
management. The same is true for overseas ventures. The
initial decision whether to proceed with a foreign
development project, should be objectively arrived at and
include all of the following steps:
* Measure market opportunities.
* Assess all of the risks of the deal.
* Explore methods of minimizing or hedging these risks.
* Review opportunity costs of employing scarce corporate
resources, both personnel and capital.
* Conduct a realistic appraisal of available development
expertise, both in-house and consulting.
* Compare expertise relative to competitors in the
market.
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* Finally, verify that anticipated outcomes match the
developer's motives for considering the venture. This
should include agreement among the development
partners on motives and the potential for development
rewards.
Development opportunities can surface quickly in a foreign
market. This was clearly the case with Canary Wharf. A
temporary market shortage of financial office space inspired
their entire effort. The process outlined above still should
be implemented in cases such as this. This process is not
necessarily burdensome. Some aspects can be expedited but
none should be omitted. As we have seen, failure to assess
any of the complex factors involved in attempting a foreign
real estate venture can result in unfulfilled expectations.
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APPENDIX
CURRENT AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES
Based on the analysis of the comparative skills of American
developers versus their foreign counterparts, there are areas
of opportunity throughout the world for American developers.
This analysis is based on field research in London and Paris,
interviews with real estate professionals active in
international markets, and a review of documentation on
global investment opportunites provided by the international
real estate advisory firms of Jones Lang Wootton and Richard
Ellis.
The following discussion is a superficial observation of many
foreign markets that may lead to the conclusion that there
are immense global opportunities for American developers.
This may be the case in some areas, however each specific




The current boom in office space demand fueled by employment
growth within London's financial sector has created enormous
opportunity for sophisticated office buildings throughout the
city. In addition, the financial conglomerates that are
currently expanding each require very large amounts of space.
American developers have extensive experience in this type of
building. Presently, large buildings are receiving approval
from city planning officials in order to meet this tenant
demand. Historically, buildings approved by the city rarely
exceeded 100,000 square feet. The size of these buildings
was prohibitive to foreign developers attempting to establish
operations in London.
Thus, current demand and planning consent is present for
larger commercial structures. However, local developers have
also seized this opportunity to develop commercial office
product for financial sector tenants. Many larger office
developments are currently being developed in the fringe
areas of London by U.K. developers. Due to current
projections for continued employment growth in the financial
services sector, this development opportunity should continue
for the next five years at a minimum. American developers,
in addition to extensive experience in the development of
larger, more complex structures, also bring with them
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financing capabilities for these larger projects. American
banks seeking to expand foreign real estate loan portfolios
are very eager to commit large amounts of capital for these
projects. Current office yields of five to seven percent for
London office buildings can be increased through larger
structures in fringe areas of the city, due to decreased land
assemblage costs.
The development of commercial office parks in suburban
locations has recently become a trend in the U.K. These
office parks resemble recent development in the U.S., with
superior building and landscape design, increased tenant
amenities, and modern office accomodation. Rosehaugh
Stanhope, a market leader in greater London, is currently
developing Stockley Park at Heathrow Airport. Retail
activity also remains very brisk throughout the U.K. U.K.
developers are currently attempting to develop large,
regional shopping centers similar to those in the U.S. Many
interviewees questioned why large American regional shopping
center developers have yet to enter into the U.K. market
based on the strength of this market and decreasing market
opportunities for this product in the U.S. Thus, there
appears to opportunity for American developers in this area,
based on land availability.
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The other major opportunity for American developers is in the
area of urban redevelopment, similar to the redevelopment of
American cities during the past two decades. Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher has placed urban redevelopment very high on
her list of priorities. This is evidenced by the amount of
Parliament action on the redevelopment of the Docklands area
including government commitments on public infrastructure
improvements and tax/capital costs allowances. Thus, the
opportunity for American developers to establish
public-private partnerships with governmental authorities for
these redevelopment opportunities exists in the U.K.
Paris
Similar planning constraints exist in Paris, where the vast
number of historically significant structures play an
important role in the planning process. The inability to
develop large commercial structures in the city creates both
problems and opportunities for the American developer. The
problem in this assessment is the great difficulty in
securing development sites or buildings capable of extensive
redevelopment or renovation, especially for the foreign
developer without local representation. However, this great
contraint also creates a substantial opportunity for modern
office buildings. A low city-wide vacancy rate in office
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buildings and continued strong demand from American and
multinational corporations creates the need for the
development of sophisticated office buildings.
Currently, London & Edinburgh Trust, in partnership with the
French development company Capital & Continental, are
developing L'Anjou, a 135,000 square foot office building in
the City of Paris. This project, a high-quality building
with large, spanned floor areas, will command the highest
office rental rates in the city (approximately $70 per square
foot using current exchange rates) due to unprecedented
demand for this accomodation. London & Edinburgh Trust's
position in this partnership represents an excellent example
of possible American involvement in Paris, or other growing
areas of France. LET provides increased financing
capabilities as well as design, construction, and other
project management assistance.
Strong demand for commercial office parks exists along Paris'
perimeter highway system. Foreign developers with existing
relationships with American and mulitnational tenants could
capitalize on build-to-suit office development opportunities.
Capital & Continental, again in partnership with LET, is
developing many build-to-suit office buildings with design
and tenant features a few years ahead of local competition.
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Similar retail opportunites, especially for regional shopping
centers, exist throughout the Paris metropolitan area. This
is not only due to strong retail demand, but also the
continued expansion of the greater Paris highway system.
However, non-development issues are much more important in
France than in the U.K. given the radical change in culture.
A knowledge of local customs and the French language is
considered essential according to those individuals
interviewed in Paris. Also, there may be greater political
risk in France than in the United Kingdom or Germany. The
new conservative ruling party has had a substantial positive
effect on commercial development. A change in this political
orientation could cause somewhat different economic
conditions. France also imposes more stringent regulatory
laws, especially to foreign entities. This includes an 18.6
percent transfer or "registration" tax on most real estate
transfers, thus imposing serious effects on the liquidity of
a real estate investment.
Germany, Belgium, and other European Countries
Germany continues to enjoy strong economic growth, especially
in the major cities of Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Dusseldorf.
Frankfort, as the leading financial center of Germany, is a
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strong commercial real estate market due to the emergence of
many international and American multinational firms in the
city. Brussels is currently experiencing strong economic
growth and a strong office market, partly due to the
continued positive effects of an expanding European Economic
Community, which is located in Brussels. Other major
European cities, due to similar planning constraints found in
London and Paris, enjoy low office vacancy rates and good
growth in office rental rates. Current commercial office
yields are still below those available in strong American
markets yet are acceptable to many foreign investors.
Again, a more stringent analysis is required for American
entry in these markets due to non-development issues
discussed in the beginning of the analysis section. Strong
cultural differences exist between these countries as well as
differing regulatory requirements and business laws. Based
on interviews conducted with individuals knowledgable with
other European cities, local representation is considered
essential. In addition, these cities are not likely to
accept large-scale American commercial development for
reasons not exclusive of their size. However, based on the
recent success of Trammell Crow, the projected success of
EuroDisney, and the experiences of American hotel companies,
there may be opportunities for smaller, progressive American
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development schemes, especially where the American developer
is capitalizing on their success in a specific
business/building type such as festival marketplaces.
Far East
The increasing westernization of the Far East provides an
excellent opportunity for American and other international
real estate ventures. As seen in Portman's experience in
Shanghai, many cities in developing countries, including
communist countries, are attempting to promote tourism and
urban commercial development. Portman's experise in
international hotel development and their reputation for
design excellence gives them an opportunity to promote these
skills in countries that want development. American
experience and existing relationships with many Japanese
firms provide opportunities for American developers in the
Far East. However, there are even greater differences in
culture and standard business processes in the Far East.
Australia
Sydney, the largest city in Australia, is experiencing a
substantial increase in commercial development, partly due to
its emergence as a major tourist destination. Other major
110
cities in Australia such as Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth
are experiencing similar increases in commercial development.
Australia prospers from a vast availability of land and
biological resources, which ultimately provides positive
economic effects for its major international cities.
Currently, a major redevelopment effort is also underway
along Sydney's waterfront.
Summary
Much of the discussion provided above is based on verbal and
written information provided by international real estate
advisory firms. These firms, most of which are expanding
their scope worldwide, are an excellent source of information
and local knowledge for the international developer.
However, as stressed throughout this thesis, this information
should only be taken as introductory knowledge. The
international developer must pursue rigourous research of
market and other non-development issues, and seek proper
local representation before attempting any venture in a
foreign market.
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